

Dalle check-list alle spinte gentili










LIKELY AND UNLIKELY









APPROVED B-17F and G CHECKLIST

REVISED 3-1-44

PILOT'S DUTIES IN RED

COPILOT'S DUTIES IN BLACK

BEFORE STARTING

- 1. Pilot's Preflight-COMPLETE
- 2. Form 1A-CHECKED
- 3. Controls and Seats-CHECKED
- 4. Fuel Transfer Valves & Switch-OFF
- 5. Intercoolers-Cold
- 6. Gyros-UNCAGED
- 7. Fuel Shut-off Switches-OPEN
- 8. Gear Switch-NEUTRAL
- Cowl Flaps—Open Right— OPEN LEFT—Locked
- 10. Turbos-OFF
- 11. Idle cut-off-CHECKED
- 12. Throttles-CLOSED
- 13. High RPM-CHECKED
- 14. Autopilot-OFF
- De-icers and Anti-icers, Wing and Prop—OFF
- 16. Cabin Heat-OFF
- 17. Generators-OFF

STARTING ENGINES

- 1. Fire Guard and Call Clear-LEFT Right
- 2. Master Switch-ON
- 3. Battery switches and inverters—ON & CHECKED
- 4. Parking Brakes—Hydraulic Check—On-CHECKED
- 5. Booster Pumps—Pressure—ON & CHECKED
- 6. Carburetor Filters-Open
- 7. Fuel Quantity-Gallons per tank
- 8. Start Engines: both magnetos on after one revolution
- 9. Flight Indicator & Vacuum Pressures
 CHECKED
- 10. Radio-On
- 11. Check Instruments—CHECKED
- 12. Crew Report
- 13. Radio Call & Altimeter-SET

ENGINE RUN-UP

- 1. Brakes-Locked
- 2. Trim Tabs-SET
- 3. Exercise Turbos and Props
- 4. Check Generators-CHECKED & OFF
- 5. Run up Engines

BEFORE TAKEOFF

- 1. Tailwheel-Locked
- 2. Gyro-Set
- 3. Generators-ON

AFTER TAKEOFF

- 1. Wheel-PILOT'S SIGNAL
- 2. Power Reduction
- 3. Cowl Flaps
- 4. Wheel Check-OK right-OK LEFT

BEFORE LANDING


- 1. Radio Call, Altimeter-SET
- 2. Crew Positions-OK
- 3. Autopilot-OFF
- 4. Booster Pumps-On
- 5. Mixture Controls-AUTO-RICH
- 6. Intercooler-Set
- 7. Carburetor Filters-Open
- 8. Wing De-icers-Off
- 9. Landing Gear
 - a. Visual—Down Right—DOWN LEFT
 Tailwheel Down, Antenna in, Ball
 Turret Checked
 - b. Light-OK
 - c. Switch Off-Neutral
- 10. Hydraulic Pressure—OK Valve closed
- 11. RPM 2100-Set
- 12. Turbos-Set
- 13. Flaps 1/3-1/3 Down


FINAL APPROACH

- 14. Flaps-PILOT'S SIGNAL
- 15. RPM 2200-PILOT'S SIGNAL











Surgical Safety Checklist



| Before induction of anaesthesia | Before skin incision | Before patient leaves operating room |
|--|---|---|
| (with at least nurse and anaesthetist) | (with nurse, anaesthetist and surgeon) | (with nurse, anaesthetist and surgeon) |
| Is the pulse oximeter on the patient and functioning? — Yes | Confirm all team members have introduced themselves by name and role. Confirm the patient's name, procedure, and where the incision will be made. Has antibiotic prophylaxis been given within the last 60 minutes? Yes The MORTALITY RATE! | Nurse Verbally Confirms: The name of the procedure Completion of instrument, sponge and needle counts Specimen labelling (read specimen labels aloud, including patient name) Whether there are any equipment problems to be addressed Surgeon, Anaesthetist and Nurse: What are the key concerns for recovery and management of this patient? |
| Known allergy? No Yes Difficult airway or aspiration risk? No Yes, and equipment/assistance available Risk of >500ml blood loss (7ml/kg in children)? No Yes, and two IVs/central access and fluids planned | To Anaesthetist: Are there any patient-specific concerns? To Nursing Team: Has sterility (including indicator results) been confirmed? Are there equipment issues or any concerns? Is essential imaging displayed? Yes Not applicable | |

This checklist is not intended to be comprehensive. Additions and modifications to fit local practice are encouraged.

Haynes NEJM 2009

The NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL of MEDICINE

ESTABLISHED IN 1812

DECEMBER 28, 2006

VOL. 355 NO. 26

An Intervention to Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infections in the ICU

Peter Pronovost, M.D., Ph.D., Dale Needham, M.D., Ph.D., Sean Berenholtz, M.D., David Sinopoli, M.P.H., M.B.A., Haitao Chu, M.D., Ph.D., Sara Cosgrove, M.D., Bryan Sexton, Ph.D., Robert Hyzy, M.D., Robert Welsh, M.D., Gary Roth, M.D., Joseph Bander, M.D., John Kepros, M.D., and Christine Goeschel, R.N., M.P.A.

66 % REDUCTION IN CATHETER-RELATED INFECTIONS!



- Wash hands with soap and water or an alcohol cleanser
- 2. Wear sterile clothing a mask, gloves, and hair covering—and cover patient with a sterile drape, except for a very small hole where the line goes in
- Clean patient's skin with chlorhexidine (a type of soap) when the line is put in
- Avoid veins in arm and leg, which are more likely to get infected than veins in chest
- Check the line for infection each day and remove when no longer needed

Source: Dr. Peter Pronovost

Provonost NEJM 2006







THE NEW YORKER

ANNALS OF MEDICINE DECEMBER 10, 2007 ISSUE

THE CHECKUST




If something so simple can transform intensive care, what else can it do?




The problem with checklists, lost in translation

Introduction of Surgical Safety Checklists in Ontario, Canada



NO DIFFERENCE....

A Checklist-based Intervention to Improve Surgical Outcomes in Michigan: Evaluation of the Keystone Surgery Program




The trouble with CHECKLS 5

An easy method that promised to save lives in hospitals worldwide may not be so simple after all.

From clinical trials



..... to real life



"There is no question that the right checklist, in the right place, with the right design and implementation, can be used enthusiastically by the right people with the right skills and can be highly effective"

ANNAL OF MEDICINE DECEMBER 10, 2007 ISSUE

THE CHECKLIST

If something so simple can transform intensive care, what else can it do?



pit crew vs cawboys

Come spingere gli individui verso comportamenti virtuosi ?



BRIEFING ROOM

ISSUES

THE ADMINISTRATION

PARTICIPATE

1600 PENN

HOME - BRIEFING ROOM - PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS - EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Briefing Room

Your Weekly Address

Speeches & Remarks

Press Briefings

Statements & Releases

White House Schedule

Presidential Actions

Executive Orders

Presidential Memoranda

Proclamations

Legislation

Nominations & Appointments

Disclosures

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 15, 2015

Executive Order -- Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People

SHARE THIS:

TWITTER



FACEBOOK



EMAIL

EXECUTIVE ORDER

USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS TO

BETTER SERVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

A growing body of evidence demonstrates that behavioral science insights -- research findings from fields such as behavioral economics and psychology about how people make decisions and act on them -- can be used to design government policies to better serve the American people.

Where Federal policies have been designed to reflect behavioral science insights, they have substantially improved outcomes for the individuals, families, communities, and businesses those policies serve. For example, automatic enrollment and automatic escalation



ABOUT US BLOG OUR WORK THE TEAM LOCATIONS JOBS CONTACT US

IN PARTNERSHIP WITH Cabinet Office

Who we are







Search

CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE INNOVATION

Accelerating Ideas to Transform Health Care

About People Portfolio Connect Publications News

Home » Penn Medicine Nudge Unit

Penn Medicine Nudge Unit

The Penn Medicine **NUDGE UNIT**


Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on October 8, 2016 - Published by group.bmj.com

Open Access Research

BMJ Open Increasing compliance with low tidal volume ventilation in the ICU with two nudge-based interventions: evaluation through intervention time-series analyses

Christopher P Bourdeaux, Matthew JC Thomas, Timothy H Gould, Gaurav Malhotra, Andreas Jarvstad, Timothy Jones, Iain D Gilchrist






Richard H. Thaler Cass R. Sunstein





Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness



«Ci sono tanti bei libri sulla razionalità e l'irrazionalità umana, ma soltanto uno è un capolavoro. Questo capolavoro si chiama *PENSIERI LENTI E VELOCI*, di Daniel Kahneman.»

FINANCIAL TIMES

PENSIERI LENTI E VELOCI



DANIEL KAHNEMAN

- PREMIO NOBEL PER L'ECONOMIA -

MONDADORI

A/3 C

12 B/A


ABC 284 2/3/4

Richard H. Thaler Cass R. Sunstein





Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness









"If you go to the men's washrooms at the Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, you may notice there's a fly in the urinals. So what do you think most men do? That's right, they aim at the fly when they urinate. They don't even think about it, and they don't need to read

a user's manual; it's just an instinctive reaction. The interesting feature of these urinals is that they're deliberately designed to take advantage of this inherent human male tendency."




Excuse me, how much did you exercise this week?

May 18, 2010 in Blog posts by nudgeblog | 1 Comment

The Wall Street Journal reports on another study showing that reminding (some call it nagging) has its virtues – this time for exercising. As part of the study, one group of people received a weekly phone call from a human asking them how much exercise they'd gotten that week and congratulating them if they had met a personal goal. Another group got a similar call from an automated system. A third group got no call.

After 12 months, participants receiving calls from a live person were exercising, as a mean, about 178 minutes a week, above government recommendations for 150 minutes a week. That represented a 78% jump from about 100 minutes a week at the start of the study. Exercise levels for the group receiving computerized calls doubled to 157 minutes a week. A control group of participants, who received no phone calls, exercised 118 minutes a week, up 28% from the study's start. "When you knew you were going to have to report back on what you had done, it motivated you," says Ms. Lowe.

BUY NUDGE TODAY



From Amazon

Share

11

tweets

From Barnes & Noble


From Borders

From The Seminary Co-op

From Powell's

From IndieBound

SUBSCRIBE



Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein

Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness

Revised and Expanded Edition






The Amsterdam urinals

The recent piece "Easy Does it" about choice architecture in the New Republic by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler opened with the example of bathroom urinals. Bathroom urinals in the Amsterdam airport, more specifically.

As all women who have ever shared a toilet with a man can attest, men can be especially spacey when it comes to their, er, aim. In the privacy of a home, that may be a mere annoyance. But, in a busy airport restroom used by throngs of travelers each day, the unpleasant effects of bad aim can add up rather quickly. Enter an ingenious economist who worked for Schiphol International Airport in Amsterdam. His idea was to etch an image of a black house fly onto the bowls of the airport's urinals, just to the left of the drain. The result: Spillage declined 80 percent. It turns out that, if you give men a target, they can't help but aim at it.



Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein

Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness

Revised and Expanded Edition






The Amsterdam urinals

The recent piece "Easy Does it" about choice architecture in the New Republic by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler opened with the example of bathroom urinals. Bathroom urinals in the Amsterdam airport, more specifically.

As all women who have ever shared a toilet with a man can attest, men can be especially spacey when it comes to their, er, aim. In the privacy of a home, that may be a mere annoyance. But, in a busy airport restroom used by throngs of travelers each day, the unpleasant effects of bad aim can add up rather quickly. Enter an ingenious economist who worked for Schiphol International Airport in Amsterdam. His idea was to etch an image of a black house fly onto the bowls of the airport's urinals, just to the left of the drain. The result: Spillage declined 80 percent. It turns out that, if you give men a target, they can't help but aim at it.



Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein

Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness

Revised and Expanded Edition





The Amsterdam urinals

The recent piece "Easy Does it" about choice architecture in the New Republic by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler opened with the example of bathroom urinals. Bathroom urinals in the Amsterdam airport, more specifically.

As all women who have ever shared a toilet with a man can attest, men can be especially spacey when it comes to their, er, aim. In the privacy of a home, that may be a mere annoyance. But, in a busy airport restroom used by throngs of travelers each day, the unpleasant effects of bad aim can add up rather quickly. Enter an ingenious economist who worked for Schiphol International Airport in Amsterdam. His idea was to etch an image of a black house fly onto the bowls of the airport's urinals, just to the left of the drain. The result: Spillage declined 80 percent. It turns out that, if you give men a target, they can't help but aim at it.



Monaco di Baviera, 2016



aeroporto Charles De Gaulle, Parigi, campionati europei di calcio 2016



Translation: "Referendum and Großdeutscher Reichstag; Ballot; Do you agree with the reunification of Austria with the German Reich that was enacted on 13 March 1938 and do you vote for the party of our leader; Adolf Hitler?; Yes; No"







POLICY FORUM

AFDICINE

Do Defaults Save Lives?

Eric J. Johnson* and Daniel Goldstein


since 1995, more than 45,000 people in the United States have died waiting for a suitable donor organ. Although an oft-cited poll (1) showed that 85% of Americans approve of organ donation, less than half had made a decision about donating, and fewer still (28%) had granted permission by signing a donor card, a pattern also observed in Germany, Spain, and Sweden (2-4). Given the shortage of donors, the gap between approval and action is a matter of life and death.

What drives the decision to become a potential donor? Within the European Union, donation rates vary by nearly an order of magnitude across countries and these differences are stable from year to year. Even when controlling for variables such as transplant infrastructure, economic and educational status, and religion (5), large differences in donation rates persist. Why?

Most public policy choices have a noaction default, that is, a condition is imposed when an individual fails to make a decision (6, 7). In the case of organ donation, European countries have one of two default policies. In presumed-consent states, people are organ donors unless they register not to be, and in explicit-consent countries, nobody is an organ donor without registering to be one.

According to a classical economics view, preferences exist and are available to the decision-maker—people simply find too little value in organ donation. This view has led to calls for the establishment of a regulated market for the organs of the deceased (8, 9), for the payment of donors or donors' families (10, 11), and even for suggestions that organs should become public property upon death (12). Calls for campaigns to change public attitudes (13) are widespread. In classical economics, defaults should have a limited effect: when defaults are not consistent with preferences, people would choose an appropriate alternative.

A different hypothesis arises from research depicting preferences as constructed, that is, not yet articulated in the minds of those who have not been asked (14–16). If



Effective consent rates, online experiment, as a function of default.

preferences for being an organ donor are constructed, defaults can influence choices in three ways: First, decision-makers might believe that defaults are suggestions by the policy-maker, which imply a recommended action. Second, making a decision often involves effort, whereas accepting the default is effortless. Many people would rather avoid making an active decision about donation, because it can be unpleasant and stressful (17). Physical effort such as filling out a form may also increase acceptance of the default (18). Finally, defaults often represent the existing state or status quo, and change usually involves a trade-off. Psychologists have shown that losses loom larger than the equivalent gains, a phenomenon known as loss aversion (19). Thus, changes in the default may result in a change of choice.


Governments, companies, and public agencies inadvertently run "natural experiments" testing the power of defaults. Studies of insurance choice (20), selection of Internet privacy policies (21, 22), and the level of pension savings (23) all show large effects, often with substantial financial consequences.

Defaults and Organ Donations

We investigated the effect of defaults on donation agreement rates in three studies. The first used an online experiment (24): 161 respondents were asked whether they would be donors on the basis of one of three questions with varying defaults. In the opt-in condition, participants were told to assume that they had just moved to a new state where the default was not to be an organ donor, and they were given a choice to confirm or change that status. The opt-out condition was identical, except the default was to be a donor. The third, neutral condition simply required them to choose with no prior default. Respondents could at a mouse click change their choice. largely eliminating effort explanations.

The form of the question had a dramatic impact (see figure, left): Revealed donation rates were about twice as high when opting-out as when opting-in. The opt-out condition did not differ significantly from the neutral condition (without a default option). Only the opt-in condition, the current practice in the United States, was significantly lower.

In the last two decades, a number of European countries have had opt-in or opt-out default options for individuals' decisions to become organ donors. Actual decisions about organ donation may be affected by governmental educational programs, the



Effective consent rates, by country. Explicit consent (opt-in, gold) and presumed consent (opt-out, blue).

The authors are at the Center for Decision Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA.

^{*}To whom all correspondence should be addressed:

POLICY FORUM

AFDICINE

Do Defaults Save Lives?

Eric J. Johnson* and Daniel Goldstein


since 1995, more than 45,000 people in the United States have died waiting for a suitable donor organ. Although an oft-cited poll (1) showed that 85% of Americans approve of organ donation, less than half had made a decision about donating, and fewer still (28%) had granted permission by signing a donor card, a pattern also observed in Germany, Spain, and Sweden (2-4). Given the shortage of donors, the gap between approval and action is a matter of life and death.

What drives the decision to become a potential donor? Within the European Union, donation rates vary by nearly an order of magnitude across countries and these differences are stable from year to year. Even when controlling for variables such as transplant infrastructure, economic and educational status, and religion (5), large differences in donation rates persist. Why?

Most public policy choices have a noaction default, that is, a condition is imposed when an individual fails to make a decision (6, 7). In the case of organ donation, European countries have one of two default policies. In presumed-consent states, people are organ donors unless they register not to be, and in explicit-consent countries, nobody is an organ donor without registering to be one.

According to a classical economics view, preferences exist and are available to the decision-maker—people simply find too little value in organ donation. This view has led to calls for the establishment of a regulated market for the organs of the deceased (8, 9), for the payment of donors or donors' families (10, 11), and even for suggestion that organs should become public properti upon death (12). Calls for campaigns ty change public attitudes (13) are widespreau. In classical economics, defaults should lawe a limited effect: when defaults are not consistent with preferences, people would shoose an appropriate alternative.

A different hypothesis arises from research depicting preferences as constructed, that is, not yet articulated in the minds of those who have not been asked (14–16). It



Effective consent rates, online experiment, as a function of default.

preferences for being an organ donor are constructed, defaults can influence choices in three ways: First, decision-makers might believe that defaults are suggestions by the policy-maker, which imply a recommended action. Second, making a decision often involves effort, whereas accepting the default is effortless. Many people would rather avoid making an active decision about donation, because it can be unpleasant and stressful (17). Physical effort such as filling out a form may also increase acceptance of the default (18). Finally, defaults often represent the existing state or status quo, and change usually involves a trade-off. Psychologists have shown that losses loom larger than the equivalent gains, a phenom loss aversion (10) mus, changes in the deesult in a change of choice.


Governments, companies, and public agencies inadvertently run "natural experiments" testing the power of defaults. Studies of insurance choice (20), selection of Internet privacy policies (21, 22), and the level of pension savings (23) all show large effects, often with substantial financial consequences.

Defaults and Organ Donations

We investigated the effect of defaults on donation agreement rates in three studies. The first used an online experiment (24): 161 respondents were asked whether they would be donors on the basis of one of three questions with varying defaults. In the opt-in condition, participants were told to assume that they had just moved to a new state where the default was not to be an organ donor, and they were given a choice to confirm or change that status. The opt-out condition was identical, except the default was to be a donor. The third, neutral condition simply required them to choose with no prior default. Respondents could at a mouse click change their choice. largely eliminating effort explanations.

The form of the question had a dramatic impact (see figure, left): Revealed donation rates were about twice as high when opting-out as when opting-in. The opt-out condition did not differ significantly from the neutral condition (without a default option). Only the opt-in condition, the current practice in the United States, was significantly lower.


In the last two decades, a number of European countries have had opt-in or opt-out default options for individuals' decisions to the way of the countries of th



Effective consent rates, by summer Explicit consent (opt-in-gold) and presumed consent (opt-out, blue).

The authors are at the Center for Decision Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA.

^{*}To whom all correspondence should be addressed:




Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on October 8, 2016 - Published by group.bmj.com

Open Access Research

BMJ Open Increasing compliance with low tidal volume ventilation in the ICU with two nudge-based interventions: evaluation through intervention time-series analyses


Christopher P Bourdeaux, Matthew JC Thomas, Timothy H Gould, Gaurav Malhotra, Andreas Jarvstad, Timothy Jones, Iain D Gilchrist






















Protect Your Patients.


Protect Your Health.




Get your flu vaccine today. It's safe, easy, and free.







USA DEATHS



the benefits of flu vaccination 2014-2015

The estimated number of influenza-associated illnesses prevented by flu vaccination during the 2014-2015 season:

1.9 million



greater than the population of the city of Philadelphia The estimated number of flu-associated medical visits prevented by vaccination during the 2014-2015 season:

966,000



as many people as can fit in Manhattan's Times Square The estimated number of flu hospitalizations prevented during the 2014-2015 season:

67,000



as many people as Seattle's Seahawks stadium can seat

get vaccinated



U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

DATA: www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/2014-15.htm Morbidity and Morfally Weekly Report (MWWR), October 4-November 28, 2015; Vol. 64, No. 48 NORDig-529 [12.10.2015

www.cdc.gov/flu









Ministero della Salute







EARN YOUR STRIPE!

MYTHS DISPELLED. TRUTHS DISPENSED. LEARN ABOUT THE FLU VACCINE AT

FLU*Free*PA.com





COPERTURA VACCINALE TRA I DIPENDENTI INFERIORE AL 10 %



CONTROLLO


| Gentile | 34. |
|---------|-----|
|---------|-----|

ti ricordiamo che dal giorno 7 novembre 2016 è disponibile il VACCINO ANTI-INFLUENZALE STAGIONALE.

La vaccinazione è gratuita. Per vaccinarti, puoi presentarti presso la <u>SoSD</u> Medico Competente Area Est (Ospedale San Giovanni Bosco, I piano) dal lunedì al venerdì dalle ore 8.00 alle ore 14.00. Per orari differenti è possibile contattare gli operatori all'interno 2408.

Gentile,


ti segnaliamo che dal giorno 7 novembre 2016 è disponibile il VACCINO ANTI-INFLUENZALE STAGIONALE.



L'obiettivo minimo per l'OMS e il Ministero della Sanità è la vaccinazione di almeno 75 operatori ospedalieri su 100




Negli USA la media di dipendenti ospedalieri vaccinati è di 60 su 100




Nel nostro Ospedale lo scorso anno solo 10 dipendenti ogni 100 hanno scelto di vaccinarsi

Gentile.....


ti segnaliamo che dal giorno 7 novembre 2016 è disponibile il VACCINO ANTI-INFLUENZALE STAGIONALE.



L'obiettivo minimo per l'OMS e il Ministero della Sanità è la vaccinazione di almeno 75 operatori ospedalieri su 100



In Italia nella scorsa stagione 50 adulti su 100 sopra i 65 anni hanno scelto di vaccinarsi



Nel nostro Ospedale lo scorso anno solo 10 dipendenti ogni 100 hanno scelto di vaccinarsi



From the Chief Medical Officer, Professor Dame Sally C Davies FRS

Richmond House 79 Whitehall London SWITA 2NS

+44 (0)20 7210 4850 +44 (0)20 7210 5407 sally.davies@dh.gsi.gov.uk www.gov.uk

Indirizzata personalmente al medico di famiglia

[GP_Name]

[Address 1]

[Address 2], [Address 3]

[Address 4], [Address 5]

29th September 2014

NOTE TO PRA GERS: PLEASE FORWARD IMMEDIATELY TO

Dear Dr [GP_Sumame]

Antibiotic usage in your practice

Antimicrobial resistance is a serious and growing threat to our health. Reducing unnecessary prescriptions in primary care may help prevent a public health catastrophe.

> The great majority (80%) of practices in [NHS Area Team] prescribe fewer antibiotics per head than yours.*

Many practices are already taking action to reduce antibiotic prescriptions while safeguarding patients' health. Please join them by taking three simple actions:

- Give patients advice on self-care instead you can use the leaflet enclosed or search online for the "TARGET antibiotics toolkit".
- 2. Consider offering a back-up (delayed) prescription instead this could be post-dated or collected by the patient a few days later if still necessary.
- 3. Talk to other prescribers in your practice to ensure they are also acting data on prescribing is recorded at practice level.

I know that prescribers are aware of this problem and that prescribing is not a simple issue. But there are small changes we can all make that will have a big effect on everyone's health.

Please join us in reducing antibiotic use.

Yours.

PROFESSOR DAME SALLY C DAVIES CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER

La grande maggioranza dei tuoi colleghi (80%)

prescrive meno antibiotici di te

3 semplici azioni

Firmata da un'autorità

v.18 19.09.14

^{*} Your practice's prescribing data are available online. Data were taken from http://www.hscic.gov.uk/ppprescribing and adjusted to take into account patient load and demographics. The 80% figure excludes outliers judged to be created by measurement error and does not include out-of-hours services. For more information on the consequences of antimicrobial resistance, see the UK 5 Year Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy.

Provision of social norm feedback to high prescribers of antibiotics in general practice: a pragmatic national randomised controlled trial

Michael Hall sworth, Tim Chadborn, Anna Sallis, Michael Sanders, Daniel Berry, Felix Greaves, Lara Clements, Sally C Davies

Summary

Background Unnecessary antibiotic prescribing contributes to antimicrobial resistance. In this trial, we aimed to reduce unnecessary prescriptions of antibiotics by general practitioners (GPs) in England.

Methods In this randomised, 2×2 factorial trial, publicly available databases were used to identify GP practices whose prescribing rate for antibiotics was in the top 20% for their National Health Service (NHS) Local Area Team. Eligible practices were randomly assigned (1:1) into two groups by computer-generated allocation sequence, stratified by NHS Local Area Team. Participants, but not investigators, were blinded to group assignment. On Sept 29, 2014, every GP in the feedback intervention group was sent a letter from England's Chief Medical Officer and a leaflet on antibiotics for use with patients. The letter stated that the practice was prescribing antibiotics at a higher rate than 80% of practices in its NHS Local Area Team. GPs in the control group received no communication. The sample was re-randomised into two groups, and in December, 2014, GP practices were either sent patient-focused information that promoted reduced use of antibiotics or received no communication. The primary outcome measure was the rate of antibiotic items dispensed per 1000 weighted population, controlling for past prescribing. Analysis was by intention to treat. This trial is registered with the ISRCTN registry, number ISRCTN32349954, and has been completed.

Findings Between Sept 8 and Sept 26, 2014, we recruited and assigned 1581 GP practices to feedback intervention (n=791) or control (n=790) groups. Letters were sent to 3227 GPs in the intervention group. Between October, 2014, and March, 2015, the rate of antibiotic items dispensed per 1000 population was 126.98 (95% CI 125.68–128.27) in the feedback intervention group and 131.25 (130.33–132.16) in the control group, a difference of 4.27 (3.3%; incidence rate ratio [IRR] 0.967 [95% CI 0.957–0.977]; p<0.0001), representing an estimated 73 406 fewer antibiotic items dispensed. In December, 2014, GP practices were re-assigned to patient-focused intervention (n=777) or control (n=804) groups. The patient-focused intervention did not significantly affect the primary outcome measure between December, 2014, and March, 2015 (antibiotic items dispensed per 1000 population: 135.00 [95% CI 133.77–136.22] in the patient-focused intervention group and 133.98 [133.06–134.90] in the control group; IRR for difference between groups 1.01, 95% CI 1.00–1.02; p=0.105).


Interpretation Social norm feedback from a high-profile messenger can substantially reduce antibiotic prescribing at low cost and at national scale; this outcome makes it a worthwhile addition to antimicrobial stewardship programmes.


THE LANCET

INCREMENTO DEL 63% DELLA COPERTURA VACCINALE



CONTROLLO





28 % 40 % 30 %









